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A number of studies have documented a reduction in aggregate macroeconomic volatility 
beginning in the early 1980s, i.e., the “Great Moderation.”  This paper documents the Great 
Moderation at the state level, finding significant heterogeneity in the timing and magnitude of 
states’ structural breaks.  For example, we find that 14 states had breaks that occurred at least 
three years before or after the aggregate break, while another 11 states did not experience any 
statistically important break during the period.  Volatility reductions were positively related to 
the initial level of volatility, durable-goods share, and per capita energy consumption; and 
negatively related to average firm size, bank-branch deregulation, and increases in the share with 
a high school diploma.  The probability of a state experiencing a break was associated with 
nondurable-goods share, energy consumption, and demographics.  We use these results to 
examine the plausibility of several explanations of the Great Moderation.  [JEL: R11, E32] 
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  The U.S. economy has experienced a number of dramatic changes during the post-War 
period.  One of these changes—a decline in the volatility of a broad range of macroeconomic 
variables—occurred in the early 1980s.  Researchers have documented the presence of structural 
breaks in the volatility of a number of national time series, including GDP (Kim and Nelson, 
1999a, McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000), consumption (Chauvet and Potter, 2001), and prices 
(Stock and Watson, 2003).  Blanchard and Simon (2001) also find a significant reduction in the 
volatility of output, although they consider the reduction as a long-term trend rather than as a 
structural break.
1  So pervasive is the evidence for an aggregate volatility reduction that, in a 
speech on February 20, 2004, at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, then-Federal 
Reserve governor Ben Bernanke described the phenomenon as “The Great Moderation.” 
  In this paper, we examine the Great Moderation using a state-level empirical business 
cycle model that allows for state-specific volatility reductions.  Our approach follows Owyang, 
Piger, and Wall (2005), who used an empirical model based on the Markov-switching model of 
Hamilton (1989) to examine cross-sectional variation in the timing and magnitude of state-level 
business cycles.  They found that state business cycles, though similar to the national cycle, 
exhibited idiosyncratic characteristics that depended on demographics and industrial 
composition.  We document the timing and size of the state-level volatility reductions by 
adapting their approach to allow for structural breaks. 
                                                 
1 Stock and Watson (2003) argue that "the evidence better supports the ‘break’ rather than the ‘trend’ 
characterization” of the volatility reduction. 
  1  We find significant variation in both the timing and the magnitude of states’ volatility 
reductions:  While 14 states had breaks that occurred at least three years before or after the 
aggregate break, another 11 states did not experience statistically important breaks (i.e., the 
model with the break did not differ greatly from the model without a break).  The states that do 
not appear to have experienced a break tended to be in the East and, as the list includes New 
York, are not small states only.  The states with the largest volatility reductions associated with 
the structural breaks were scattered across the Mountain region, the upper Midwest/Great Lakes 
area, and the Ohio and Mississippi valleys.  The smallest volatility reductions tended to be for 
states along the Eastern Seaboard.
2   
  This cross-section of structural breaks provides us with a large number of volatility 
reductions to study, rather than the single national-level event that is usually considered.  
Because the magnitude and timing of states’ structural breaks were associated with several state-
level characteristics, our results are useful in sorting through the various hypotheses about the 
causes of the Great Moderation.  More specifically, volatility reductions were largest in states 
with relatively high initial levels of volatility, high concentrations in durable-goods industries, 
and/or high average energy consumption.  They were smallest in states with high average firm 
size, bank-branch deregulation, and increases in the share with a high school diploma.  Large 
concentrations in nondurables tended to mean a lower probability of a break, as did high average 
energy consumption.  On the other hand, the presence of large firms or a large share of young 
                                                 
2 We should point out concurrent work by Carlino, DeFina, and Sill (2007) that also uses state-level employment 
data to examine the post-War reduction in volatility.  The fundamental difference between their paper and ours is 
that they are interested in volatility reduction as a long-term trend (à la Blanchard and Simon, 2001) rather than as a 
structural break.  Like us, however, they allow for state-specific structural breaks and find significant variation.  See 
also Carlino, DeFina, and Sill (2005). 
  2workers tended to mean a higher probability of a break.  As we will argue, this set of results 
suggests that only one of the five main hypotheses about the Great Moderation—improved 
monetary policy—is consistent with the pattern of state-level volatility reductions. 
    The remainder of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 examines the evidence for a 
reduction in the volatility of aggregate employment.  Section 3 performs a similar exercise but at 
the state level.  Section 4 considers a list of possible covariates for the characteristics of states’ 
structural breaks.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Volatility Reduction in Aggregate Employment 
  Many recent papers have discussed the nature of the volatility reduction in aggregate 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and other variables.  We will use employment data because of a 
lack of a suitable alternative to GDP series at the state level.  Although Gross State Product 
series are available, their yearly frequency makes them unsuitable because an entire business 
cycle event such as a recession can occur within a single calendar year.  For this and subsequent 
sections, the data we use are seasonally adjusted, monthly payroll employment from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.  Each of the models is estimated in annualized growth rates.  To ease 
comparison between the national and state-level models, the aggregate model is estimated using 
the growth rate constructed from the sum of the levels of the 48 contiguous states and the District 
of Columbia.  All series extend from 1956:02 through 2004:12. 
  32.1 The Model 
  Our model is a straightforward extension of the Markov-switching model of Hamilton 
(1989) in which we suppress the autoregressive dynamics for simplicity.  A benefit of the 
Markov-switching model is its explicit representation of business cycle phases.
3  In addition, we 
allow for the possibility of a structural break in the regime-dependent steady-state growth rates 
of employment as well as the conditional variance of employment.  Let Yt reflect the growth rate 
of aggregate employment; then, 
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thought of as recession and expansion growth rates.  The pattern of recession and expansion is 
governed by a first-order hidden Markov variable St, which has transition probabilities 
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which also are subject to the structural break. 
                                                 
3 An alternate approach to our strategy is employed by Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2004), who perform a spectral 
decomposition of some aggregate macroeconomic series. 
  42.2 Estimation 
  The model in the preceding subsection is estimated using Bayesian techniques via the 
Gibbs sampler (Gelfand and Smith, 1990).
4  Bayesian estimation requires prior distributions 
chosen by the econometrician.  In this case, we assume that (i) the vector of conditional mean 
parameters λ has a multivariate normal prior distribution, (ii) each conditional variance has an 
inverse gamma prior distribution, and (iii) each transition probability has a beta prior 
distribution.  Each distribution is parameterized to yield a proper, yet diffuse, prior.  To capture 
the volatility reduction, we assume the break parameter τ has a discrete uniform prior distribution 
over all possible break dates.  Given these prior distributions, estimation using the Gibbs sampler 
is straightforward.  The hidden Markov variable is drawn from the procedure discussed in Kim 
and Nelson (1999b).  Conditional on the draws for the parameter vectors and the hidden Markov 
variable, the posterior distribution for candidate break dates is multinomial with probabilities that 
are proportional to the model likelihood function (Carlin, Gelfand, and Smith, 1992). 
  To evaluate the evidence in favor of the model with a structural break, we estimate the 
model above without the structural break, denoted M0, and with the structural break, denoted M1, 
and then compute the marginal data density; , j = 0,1; for each model.  The evidence in 
favor of M1 is then summarized by the Bayes Factor: 
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4 The Gibbs sampler is a Markov-chain Monte Carlo procedure in which the joint distribution for all parameters is 
obtained via sampling from the conditional distributions of each parameter.  Repeated iterations of draws from the 
individual conditional densities produce a collection of draws that form the ergodic distribution for the full set of 
parameters, including the break date τ. 
  5Jeffreys (1961) provides a log scale for the interpretation of B10 given as  
) ln( 10 B  < 0  M0 preferred 
0 <   < 1.2  ) ln( 10 B Very slight evidence in favor of M1 
1.2 <   < 2.3 ) ln( 10 B Slight evidence in favor of M1 
2.3 <   < 4.6 ) ln( 10 B Strong evidence in favor of M1 
) ln( 10 B  > 4.6  Decisive evidence in favor of M1 
  Intuition for the Jeffreys scale can be obtained by noting that with equal prior probability 
given to M0 and M1, so that p(M0 ) = p(M1), the Bayes Factor is equivalent to the posterior odds 
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Thus, “strong” evidence on the Jeffreys scale indicates that model M1 is deemed to be e
2.3≈10 
times (or greater) more likely than M0. 
2.3 Results 
  Estimation yields a number of results that confirm the presence of a volatility reduction in 
aggregate employment (see Table 1).  The posterior median of the break date is September 1984, 
and the 5
th and 95
th percentiles of the break date are March 1984 and May 1985.
5  The log Bayes 
factor in favor of the model with a break versus the model with no break is 20.9, providing 
decisive evidence of a structural break using the Jeffreys scale.  Moreover, the break affects 
several aspects of the aggregate employment process, corresponding to a reduction in σ² 
                                                 
5 McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) document the structural break in volatility of GDP in the first quarter of 1984.  
Not surprisingly, the median volatility reduction in aggregate employment occurs slightly later.  All break dates 
cited in the literature, however, lie within the 5
th and 95
th percentiles of the posterior distribution for our aggregate 
employment break. 
  6(reduction in residual variance), a decline in the absolute value of both μ0 and μ1 (recessions are 
less severe; expansions are less robust), and an increase in both p and q (business cycle phases 
last longer).  The ratio of the post- to pre-break unconditional standard deviation of Yt has a 
posterior median of 0.573, with 5
th and 95
th posterior percentiles of 0.572 and 0.582.  Thus, the 
structural break corresponds to a roughly 43 percent reduction in the volatility of Yt.  With these 
results in mind, we decompose the aggregate volatility reduction into its state-level elements. 
 
3. State-Level Volatility Reductions 
  In this section, we modify the Hamilton model outlined above to account for the 
possibility that states’ structural breaks differed in timing and magnitude from each others’ and 
from the aggregate break.  
3.1 Model 
  The model for an individual state i’s employment growth rate is analogous to the model 
for aggregate employment growth: 
  ( )( ) ( ) , 1 D S D S y , 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 it it it B i B i it it A i A i it η + μ + μ + − μ + μ =          (2) 
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and Dit = 0 when t , and 1 otherwise.   i τ <
  7  Here, we have assumed that each state has an idiosyncratic business cycle governed by its 
own hidden Markov variable Sit.  Further, each state is allowed to experience a volatility 
reduction with idiosyncratic timing τi.  To focus on the breaks associated with the volatility 
reduction, τi is restricted to be within ten years on either side of the posterior median of the 
aggregate break date, i.e., between October 1974 and August 1994.  Estimation for each state is 
as described in the previous section.  As above, we estimate the model with and without a break 
to determine the likelihood of a break in all parameters. 
3.2 Results 
  To highlight the geographic dimension of our results, we present them in maps.  The 
information underlying the maps is provided in the appendix.  Figure 1 summarizes the state-
level evidence for the model with a break, as summarized by the log Bayes factors.  The model 
with a break is preferred for all but the District of Columbia and six states—Georgia, Maine, 
Maryland, New York, South Carolina, and West Virginia—all states located on or near the 
Atlantic coast.  For 38 states, the log Bayes Factor is greater than 2.3, meaning there is strong 
evidence for a structural break using the Jeffreys scale.  The additional exceptions to the states 
listed above are Massachusetts, Nebraska, Tennessee, and Vermont. 
  Some of the states for which there is strong evidence of a break experience their volatility 
reduction outside three years of the estimated aggregate break date.  Figure 1 also separates from 
the rest those states which exhibit strong evidence of a break outside of three years of the median 
  8date for the aggregate—14 of the states.
6  Finally, for 27 states, the 90 percent posterior error 
band around the median break date does not overlap with that for the aggregate.
7 
  Figure 2 gives the posterior median of each state’s break date, with lighter colors 
indicating an earlier break.  These results highlight the substantial heterogeneity in the timing of 
each state’s volatility reduction, which appears to be influenced by geographic contiguity.  
Specifically, the figure suggests some geographical pattern to the break dates, with three states in 
the West experiencing the volatility reduction first, followed by the Great Lakes and Plains.  
Moreover, some states do not experience a decline in volatility, with these states mostly located 
in the East. 
  Figure 3 illustrates the posterior median of the ratio of the unconditional standard 
deviation of yit in the pre- and post-break periods.
8,9  Darker-colored states have a lower 
volatility ratio, indicating a higher reduction in variance.  Only the District of Columbia has a 
ratio greater than one, meaning that volatility actually increased after the break.  Recall, 
however, that D.C. is one case for which the model with no structural break was the preferred 
model.  For the other states, the largest volatility reduction occurred in Arkansas, for which the 
posterior median of the volatility ratio is 0.47, while the smallest occurred in South Carolina, 
which the posterior median of the ratio is 0.87.  Again, South Carolina is a state for which the 
for 
                                                 
6 Results for the posterior 5
th and 95
th percentiles for the break date are in the appendix. 
7 See the appendix for the identities of these states.  This preponderance of state breaks that are not coincident with 
the aggregate break is in contrast with Anderson and Vahid (2003), who find only two break dates in state-level 
personal income that are statistically different from the aggregate break date. 
8 Figure 3 illustrates the ratio of volatilities regardless of whether or not the break is preferred. 
9 In addition, we note that many state-level business cycles became more persistent, i.e., both transition probabilities 
p and q rose after the break. 
  9preferred model does not have structural break.  For 20 of the states, the volatility ratio is
than for the aggregate data, meaning the volatility reductio
 smaller 
n is larger. 
                                                
  From these results we can rule out that the volatility reduction in aggregate employment 
arose from state business cycles becoming less synchronous while state-level volatility remained 
the same.
10  Our results above indicate clearly that states experienced volatility reductions of 
their own.  Further, an examination of the concordance of state business cycles shows that state 
economies actually became more synchronous after September 1984, the date of the break in the 
national employment series.  Specifically, we calculated the concordance between the business 
cycles of each state and every other state and found the average concordance before the 
aggregate break to have been 0.57, while the post-break average concordance was 0.81.
11  The 
complete set of state average concordances for the two periods is provided in an appendix. 
 
4. Explaining States’ Great Moderations 
  In the previous section, we documented state-level heterogeneity in the timing and 
magnitude of the volatility reduction in total payroll employment.  Here, we check whether the 
volatility ratios (Figure 3) and the break dates (Figure 2) are related statistically to state-level 
characteristics.  To obtain our list of possible covariates, we use as a guide the five hypotheses 
posited by the literature on the origins of the Great Moderation, which we summarize below.  In 
addition to helping explain our state-level differences, this exercise should shed some light on 
the plausibility of the five hypotheses. 
 
10 We are indebted to one of the referees for pointing this out to us. 
11 The concordance of two business cycles is the percentage of time that the two economies are in the same regime 
(Harding and Pagan, 2002), which we calculate using the probabilities of the regimes.   
  104.1 Hypotheses for the Great Moderation 
  According to the inventory hypothesis, innovations in inventory management in the 
durable-goods sectors have led to reductions in the volatility of output (Kahn, McConnell, and 
Perez-Quiros, 2002).
12  If this hypothesis holds, we should see a negative relationship between 
the volatility ratio and the durable-goods share, but that there should be no such link between the 
volatility ratio and other sectors of the economy.  To account for the rest of the economy we 
include the nondurable-goods share and the initial (pre-break) average volatility.  
  According to the good-luck hypothesis, the reduction in output volatility was associated 
with reductions in the volatility of various (and often unspecified) innovations and shocks 
(Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson, 2004).  These shocks and innovations can come from a myriad of 
sources, two of which we control for in our regressions: energy shocks and productivity shocks.  
If reductions in the volatility of energy prices have led to reductions in output volatility, we 
might expect to find that the volatility ratio is negatively related to the extractive-industries 
employment share.  Also, because reductions in the volatility of energy prices should affect the 
users of energy, we might expect that the reductions in the volatility of employment were 
greatest in the states with the highest energy-usage rates.  If the good luck was instead through 
reductions in the volatility of productivity shocks throughout the economy, we should find that 
the volatility ratio is negatively related to the relative importance of both durable and nondurable 
goods. 
                                                 
12 For alternative perspectives on the role of inventory management, see Herrera and Pesavento (2005), Ramey and 
Vine (2004), and Khan and Thomas (2007). 
  11  Boivin and Giannoni (2006) posit that it was reductions in the volatility of monetary 
policy that led to reductions in output volatility.  According to this hypothesis, the Fed has 
changed the way in which it reacts to inflation and output tradeoffs, meaning that it has become 
less willing to try to fine tune the output side of the economy by adjusting monetary policy, 
thereby reducing output volatility.  If this monetary hypothesis is correct, we should see 
statistical relationships between the sizes and timing of volatility reductions and measures of the 
three channels of monetary policy: the money channel, the broad credit channel, and the narrow 
credit channel.  Detailed discussions of these channels are provided by Cecchetti (1995), 
Bernanke and Blinder (1988), and Kashyap and Stein (1995, 2000), respectively.   
  Carlino and DeFina (1998) employ a set of state-level characteristics to capture the 
importance of each of these channels:  Through the money (or direct) channel, because durable-
goods industries are relatively interest-rate sensitive, the largest volatility reductions should be in 
states with large durable-goods sectors, i.e., the volatility ratio and the durable-goods share 
should be negatively related.  Through the broad credit channel, because large firms are thought 
to have information and transaction-cost advantages in dealing with banks, large firms are less 
affected by volatile monetary policy.  In other words, the relationship between the volatility ratio 
and average firm size should be positive.  Through the narrow credit channel, because large 
banks have more alternative funding sources when monetary policy is tight, states in which large 
banks are relatively more important should be less affected by volatile monetary policy; i.e., 
there should be a positive relationship between the volatility ratio and the banking concentration.   
  12  Jaimovich and Siu (2007) argue that changing demographics, in particular a smaller 
share of the relatively volatile 15-29 year old group, meant that the economy as a whole became 
less volatile.  Thus, states that saw larger reductions in this age group should also have seen 
greater reductions in volatility.  By the same token, larger changes in the shares of other volatile 
groups should also translate into larger volatility reductions.  In particular, the significant 
increases that occurred in the 1970s in the shares of those with at least a high school diploma 
might be related to the Great Moderation. 
  Most recently, Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006) suggest that banking deregulation, 
specifically the relaxation of Regulation Q, can explain the Great Moderation.  We look more 
broadly at the deregulation that occurred in the banking sector since the 1970s.  Of particular 
interest for us since we are viewing events at the state level is the wave of merger and branching 
deregulation that states enacted.  Unlike the phase-out of Regulation Q, which occurred through 
the first half of the 1980s, merger and branching deregulation occurred at different times across 
states, and might be consistent with the sizes and patterns of breaks that we have reported.  
Strahan (2003) provides a discussion of this deregulation, which allowed interstate branching 
versus mergers and acquisition, unrestricted intrastate branching, and interstate banking. 
4.2 Covariates for Volatility Ratios 
  To capture the effects of the first three hypotheses, we include as independent variables 
the nondurable and durable employment shares, the extractive-industries employment share, per 
capita energy consumption, average firm size, and the deposit share at the five largest banks.  To 
capture the effect of banking deregulation, we include dummy variables to indicate whether the 
  13three types of deregulation were in place at the time of the break.  Finally, we capture the effects 
of demographic changes by including the changes in the shares of states’ populations with high 
school diplomas and the changes in the shares aged 15-29.  Table 2 outlines the directions of the 
relationships between these variables and the volatility ratios and the break dates that fit the 
various hypotheses of the Great Moderation.  The data sources and summary statistics for all of 
these variables are provided in an appendix. 
  We estimate the relationship between the volatility ratio and these variables with a spatial 
error model that uses a contiguity matrix for spatial weights.  As shown in Table 3, despite the 
fact that the coefficient on the spatial error is not statistically significant, the results are stronger 
than when we use OLS.  Our results are consistent with several of the hypotheses and 
inconsistent with two of them.  First, there is a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between the volatility ratio and the durable-goods share, but not the nondurable-goods share: the 
larger a state’s durable-goods sector was, the larger was the reduction in volatility.  This result is 
consistent with the inventory hypothesis, the productivity version of the good-luck hypothesis, 
and the money channel of the monetary hypothesis.   
  Note that volatility reductions tended to be larger in states with high pre-break 
volatilities, indicating that the volatility reductions were not coming solely through the durable-
goods sector, but were based more broadly, even after controlling for durable-goods shares.  This 
result suggests that whatever led to reductions in the volatility of output, it was not confined to 
the durable-goods sector, thereby weakening the evidence in favor of the inventory hypothesis.  
Further, the case for the monetary hypothesis is strengthened by the positive link between the 
  14volatility ratio and average firm size, suggesting a role for the broad monetary channel.  Also, 
evidence in favor of the oil version of the good-luck hypothesis is provided by the negative link 
between the volatility ratio and per capita energy consumption: states with higher average energy 
consumption tended to see larger reductions in volatility.   
  Our results so far do not provide enough evidence to choose from among the inventory, 
good-luck, or monetary hypotheses.  On the other hand, the results are stronger in terms of ruling 
out the demography and bank deregulation hypotheses.  Specifically, the positive sign on the 
dummy for unrestricted intrastate branching indicates that states that had done this deregulation 
before their break tended to see smaller volatility reductions.  Similarly, the positive sign on the 
change in the share with a high school diploma runs counter to expectations about the effects of 
demographics: The larger was a state’s increase in its share in this less volatile group, the smaller 
was its volatility reduction. 
4.3 Break Probabilities 
  As mentioned above, our cross-section of volatility reductions is broadly consistent with 
parts of each of the three main hypotheses for the Great Moderation.  This is not completely 
satisfying in that we are left with little to distinguish among the three hypotheses and are left 
without any evidence from the time dimension of the Great Moderation.  To address both of 
these issues, we make use of the time information that is available to us—the dates of the states’ 
structural breaks.  We use these dates and estimate a proportional hazards model to see if any 
from our list of state characteristics are associated with the timing of state reductions in 
  15volatility.
13  If, for example, the inventory hypothesis holds, then states that produced relatively 
more durable goods should have been more likely experience a volatility reduction before other 
states.  A positive coefficient on a variable would indicate that a higher value for the variable is 
associated with a higher chance of the break occurring sooner.   
  From the list of variables used above, we excluded the banking deregulation dummies 
because they seem to be unlikely candidates for causing the breaks.  We address the banking 
deregulation hypothesis in a separate subsection below.  As reported in Table 4, the coefficient 
on the durable-goods share is statistically no different from zero, indicating that we cannot say 
that the timing of states’ structural breaks were related to the sizes of their durable-goods sectors.  
A statistically significant positive sign on this coefficient would have been consistent with the 
inventory hypothesis, the productivity version of the good-luck hypothesis, and the monetary 
hypothesis.   
  The coefficient on the nondurable-goods share is negative and statistically significant, 
indicating that a larger nondurable-goods share meant a later break.  This result is counter to the 
productivity version of the good-luck hypothesis, by which productivity increases throughout the 
economy led to reduced volatility.  The oil version of the good-luck hypothesis is also 
inconsistent with our results because the significant negative coefficient on per capita energy 
consumption indicates that higher energy consumption meant a later volatility reduction.  
                                                 
13 The proportional hazards model is a tool common in survival analysis that models the effect of covariates (often 
termed 'treatments') on the time before an event, e.g., death, mechanical failure, or, in our case, structural change.  
The proportional hazards model assesses the covariate's effect on the probability of structural change in any given 
period and is consistent with our underlying assumption of a single break in volatility.  In the alternative case of 
multiple fluctuations between high and low volatility phases, the binomial probit or logit models might be more 
appropriate. 
  16Finally, the share aged 15-29 (a relatively volatile group) tends to mean an earlier, counter to the 
predictions of the age version of the demography hypothesis.  
  Of the five hypotheses, only the monetary hypothesis is consistent with the results from 
our hazards model.  Specifically, consistent with the broad channel for monetary policy, states 
with relatively high shares of large firms tended to have had later volatility reductions.  On the 
other hand, none of the coefficients on the variables representing the money and narrow channels 
of monetary policy are statistically different from zero. 
4.4 The Banking Deregulation and Break Dates 
  At the national level, the relaxation of Regulation Q seems to coincide with the timing of 
the aggregate volatility reduction, lending support to Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel’s (2006) 
contentions.  Given timing of the state-level volatility reductions, however, we can rule out the 
relaxation of Regulation Q as a cause of the Great Moderation.  Regulation Q was phased out 
over a number of years in the early 1980s, so it is difficult to square with the fact that a large 
number of states experienced their breaks in advance of this deregulation.   
  Confidence in the banking deregulation hypothesis is eroded further by an examination of 
the timing of state-level banking deregulations relative to states’ volatility reduction.  In lieu of a 
formal analysis, we offer Figure 4, which plots the difference in the timing of the earliest 
banking regulation change and each state’s volatility reduction on the horizontal axis and the size 
of the state’s volatility reduction on the vertical-axis.  A zero on the horizontal axis indicates that 
a state’s break date and its banking deregulation were coincident.  While a number of states did 
have deregulation prior to their volatility break, a substantial proportion experience their 
  17volatility reductions two to four years before any change in banking regulations.  Large states are 
split.  In particular, California, Illinois, and Ohio deregulated before their volatility breaks while 
Indiana, Michigan, New York, Pennsylvania, and Texas experienced their volatility reductions 
after their change in banking regulations.  This suggests that changes in banking regulation, at 
least at the state level, could not have been the catalyst for state-level volatility reductions. 
4.5 The Plausibility of the Five Hypotheses 
  Taken together, we can assess the overall plausibility of the five hypotheses for the Great 
Moderation according to whether or not our results from Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with the 
expected results for the hypotheses.  In Table 5, an estimated coefficient is called: “consistent” 
with a hypothesis if it is statistically significant and has the expected sign; “inconsistent” with a 
hypothesis if it is statistically significant and the sign is opposite of what was expected; and 
“neither” if it was statistically no different from zero.  A plausible hypothesis is one for which 
none of the estimated coefficients were inconsistent.  Overall, of the five hypotheses, the 
monetary hypothesis remains plausible. 
  The inventory hypothesis is implausible because, although states with large durable-
goods sectors saw larger volatility reductions, large reductions were also experienced by states 
with high pre-break volatility levels unrelated to durable goods.  The negative relationships 
between the probability of a break and per capita energy consumption and nondurable-goods 
share suggest that neither version of the good-luck hypothesis is plausible.  The demography 
hypothesis is implausible also because smaller volatility reductions tended to occur in states that 
  18saw small changes in the share with a high school diploma, and the size of the 15-29 age group 
tended to mean a higher break probability.  
  The banking deregulation hypothesis is implausible on three fronts.  First, the relaxation 
of Regulation Q occurred well after the volatility reductions of a large number of states; Second, 
states that deregulated their banking sector prior to their break tended to see smaller volatility 
reductions; And, third, a substantial proportion of states experienced their volatility reductions 
well in advance of any change in their banking regulations. 
  According to our results, only the monetary hypothesis remains a plausible explanation 
for the Great Moderation.  The hypothesis is consistent with our findings that states with large 
durable-goods sectors tended to have experienced larger reductions in volatility, and a high 
average firm size tended to mean a smaller volatility reduction and a higher probability of a 
structural break.   
 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
  This paper documented the Great Moderation at the state level and found significant 
heterogeneity in the timing and magnitude of states’ structural breaks.  Specifically, we found 
that 38 states experienced a structural break and that 14 states had breaks that occurred at least 
three years before or after the aggregate break, which we place at September 1984.  The states 
for which we found weak or little evidence of a break tended to be along the Atlantic coast.   
  Typically, when macroeconomists are looking for explanations for the Great Moderation, 
they have only the single aggregate occurrence with which to work.  As a result, several 
  19hypotheses have gained support on the basis of temporal coincidence between various events or 
trends and this single volatility reduction.  Unfortunately for this approach, however, a surfeit of 
events occurred alongside the Great Moderation, so it is difficult to sort out the many 
theoretically plausible explanations.  Our set of state-level great moderations might, therefore, be 
useful in sorting through the various hypotheses.   
  Of the five main hypotheses that have been put forth, our results suggest that four of 
them—the inventory, good-luck, banking deregulation, and demography hypotheses—are 
implausible because they are statistically inconsistent with the state-level pattern of structural 
breaks.  On the other hand, we found that the monetary hypothesis remains a plausible 
explanation of the Great Moderation in that it is not inconsistent with the state-level experience. 
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5th and 95th 




Ratio Break  Date 
5th and 95th 
Percentiles
United States  20.9  0.57  September 1984 -6 8  
Alabama* 20.5  0.58  January  1987  -8  10  Nebraska 1.4  0.75  March  1982  -76 26
Arizona* 21.4  0.59  March  1982  -14  6 Nevada*  31.2  0.63  November  1977  -14 38
Arkansas* 54.6  0.47  June  1981  0 4    New  Hampshire*  27.2  0.50  November  1990  -21 10
California* 28.3  0.68  November  1977  -14  49 New  Jersey*  11.8  0.70  October  1981  -72 28
Colorado* 26.8  0.66  August  1981  -68  10 New  Mexico*  9.9  0.50  June  1982  -35 5
Connecticut 21.0  0.66  March  1978  -28  90  New York  -7.7  0.79  April  1974  -22 169
Delaware* 455.8  0.48  April  1989  -3  11 North  Carolina* 8.4  0.69  August 1981  -61 13
Dist. of Col.  -10.4  1.13  July  1978  -146  36 North  Dakota*  30.8  0.56  February  1980  -37 10
Florida* 18.4  0.69  January  1982  -47  8 Ohio*  36.9  0.51  June  1981 -5 9
Georgia -2.0  0.79  April  1982  -89  13 Oklahoma*  18.0  0.58  August 1986 -6 13
Idaho 32.3  0.51  February  1984  -8  12 Oregon*  37.0  0.53  January  1982 -8 10
Illinois 11.7  0.61  November  1986  -18  14 Pennsylvania*  18.4  0.57  March  1981  -10 8
Indiana* 37.2  0.53  June  1981  -5  6 Rhode  Island*  16.4  0.55  January  1990 -5 10
Iowa* 28.6  0.56  January  1981  -10  7  South Carolina  -3.0  0.87  July  1987  -22 15
Kansas 3.6  0.75  June  1979  -36  123 South  Dakota  29.2  0.54  July  1985 -2 4
Kentucky* 42.8  0.50  November  1981  -6  9  Tennessee 1.5  0.71  August  1981  -7 57
Louisiana 35.5  0.52  March  1984  -4  7 Texas  20.4  0.59  August 1984 -3 10
Maine -2.2  0.74  February  1988  -23  15 Utah*  63.3  0.51  January  1978  -27 12
Maryland -9.2  0.84  April  1985  -41  29  Vermont 0.9  0.73  June  1987  -27 41
Massachusetts 2.2  0.64  October  1990  -27  8 Virginia  4.5  0.74  November  1984  -13 16
Michigan* 33.3  0.54  April  1981  -15  21 Washington  22  0.59  August 1981 -6 77
Minnesota* 35.2  0.53  April  1982  -8  4  West Virginia  -18.9  0.76  October  1987  -14 49
Mississippi* 17.2  0.65  February  1981  -27  7 Wisconsin*  32.4  0.53  October  1981 -7 15
Missouri* 22.5  0.58  April  1982  -3  14 Wyoming  33.4  0.51  September  1987  -28 9
Montana 19.0  0.61  October  1986  -101  21             
States in italics are those for which the model with a break is not at least “strongly preferred.”  The 5th and 95th percentiles of the posterior 
distribution are expressed as differences in months from the posterior median.   An “*” indicates that the 90 percent posterior error band around 
the median break date does not overlap with that for the aggregate. 
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Appendix: Summary Statistics 
 Mean  Standard  Deviation 
Volatility ratio  0.628  0.126 
Pre-break standard deviation  0.473  0.112 
Average durable-goods share 1969-83  0.099  0.051 
Average nondurable-goods share 1969-83  0.076  0.042 
Average extractive share 1969-83  0.014  0.021 
Average per capita energy consumption 1969-83  0.354  0.119 
Average firm size 1988  16.333  3.044 
Deposit share of 5 largest banks 1983  0.540  0.218 
Increase in share w/HS diploma  0.211  0.042 
Decrease in share aged 15-29  0.013  0.011 
Industry shares are from the BLS; per capita energy consumption is from the Energy Information 
Administration; average firm size is from Statistics of U.S. Business; the deposit share of the five 
largest banks is from the State and Metro Area Data Book 1986.  Average firm size and deposit 
share are for the first year for which data are available. The increase in the share of those 25 or 
older with a high school diploma is the difference between the average for 1990 and 2000 and the 
average for 1970 and 1980. The decrease in the share aged 15-29 is the difference between five 
years before the break and five years after it. 
 
 
Appendix: Pre- and Post-Break Average Concordances 
 Pre-Break  Post-Break     Pre-Break  Post-Break 
Alabama  0.64 0.84    Nebraska  0.43 0.84 
Arizona  0.63 0.83    Nevada  0.46 0.84 
Arkansas  0.61 0.83    New  Hampshire 0.53 0.84 
California  0.61 0.82    New  Jersey 0.58 0.85 
Colorado  0.60 0.83    New  Mexico  0.62 0.85 
Connecticut 0.57 0.83    New  York  0.64 0.85 
Delaware  0.61 0.83    North  Carolina  0.66 0.84 
Dist. of Col.  0.61  0.82    North Dakota  0.66  0.85 
Florida  0.62 0.82    Ohio  0.66 0.83 
Georgia  0.63 0.82    Oklahoma  0.64 0.83 
Idaho  0.63 0.82    Oregon  0.65 0.85 
Illinois  0.62 0.82    Pennsylvania  0.65 0.84 
Indiana  0.62 0.82    Rhode  Island  0.66 0.84 
Iowa  0.60 0.82    South  Carolina  0.66 0.83 
Kansas  0.55 0.82    South  Dakota  0.65 0.84 
Kentucky  0.52 0.81    Tennessee  0.64 0.84 
Louisiana  0.51 0.82    Texas  0.63 0.83 
Maine  0.53 0.82    Utah  0.60 0.83 
Maryland  0.52 0.82    Vermont  0.60 0.83 
Massachusetts  0.49 0.81    Virginia  0.62 0.83 
Michigan  0.47 0.83    Washington 0.63 0.82 
Minnesota  0.46 0.83    West  Virginia  0.64 0.83 
Mississippi  0.45 0.83    Wisconsin  0.62 0.83 
Missouri  0.43 0.84    Wyoming  0.61 0.83 
Montana 0.42  0.84    Mean  0.57  0.81 
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Table 1: Results for Aggregate Employment 
Log Bayes factor  20.9 
Break Date   
   Posterior median  September 1984 
   5th and 95th percentiles  March 1984, May 1985
Volatility Ratio   
   Posterior median  0.573 











Table 2: Expected Covariations Corresponding to the Hypotheses for the Great Moderation 
    Good Luck  Monetary Channels 





Initial volatility  0    
Durable-goods share  – – –    
Nondurable-goods share  0 –    
Extractive share   –   
Energy consumption   –   
Firm size   +   
Deposit share of 5 largest banks   +   
Banking deregulation dummies       –
Increase in share w/HS diploma     – 
Decrease in share aged 15-29     – 
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Table 3: Volatility Reduction and State Characteristics 
Dependent Variable = Post-Break Volatility/Pre-Break Volatility 
 Spatial  Error  Model  Ordinary Least Squares 
 Coefficient s.e.  t-stat Coefficient  s.e.  t-stat 
Pre-break standard deviation  -0.425  0.091  -4.68  -0.414  0.108  -3.83 
Average durable-goods share  -0.780  0.260  -3.00  -0.822  0.318  -2.59 
Average nondurable-goods share  -0.295  0.536  -0.55  -0.343  0.617  -0.56 
Average extractive share   1.171  1.109   1.06  0.978  1.319  0.74 
Average per capita energy consumption  -0.341  0.137  -2.49  -0.289  0.146  -1.98 
Average firm size   0.015  0.007   1.89  0.013  0.008  1.68 
Deposit share of 5 largest banks  -0.023  0.091  -0.25  -0.008  0.109  -0.08 
Intrastate branching via M&A prior to break  -0.017  0.036  -0.46  -0.009  0.042  -0.22 
Unrestricted intrastate branching prior to break  0.095  0.041   2.29  0.088  0.050  1.74 
Interstate banking prior to break  -0.009  0.038  -0.23  -0.006  0.045  -0.13 
Increase in share w/HS diploma   0.911  0.421   2.16  0.812  0.495  1.64 
Decrease in share aged 15-29   1.480  1.528   0.97  0.876  1.839  0.48 
Constant   0.644  0.163   3.96  0.604  0.190  3.17 
λ -0.018  0.015  -1.21  -  -  - 
Wald test of λ = 0  χ
2(1) = 1.464    -   
The spatial error model estimated by maximum likelihood with spatial weights that are binary to indicate contiguity.  







Table 4: Proportional Hazards Model 
Dependent Variable = Break Month (1956:01 = 0) 
 Coefficient  s.e.  t-stat 
Average durable-goods share   -5.29    4.36  -1.21 
Average nondurable-goods share  -23.18    7.64  -3.03 
Average extractive share     1.96    1.92   1.02 
Average per capita energy consumption   -42.45  18.02  -2.36 
Average firm size      0.15    0.07   2.12 
Deposit share of 5 largest banks    -0.97    1.11  -0.88 
Average share w/4 or more yrs. of HS    -3.46    3.30  -1.05 
Average share aged 15-29    23.38  11.38   2.05 
Constant   -70.15    9.23  -7.60 
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Table 5: Consistency of Results with the Hypotheses for the Great Moderation 
    Good Luck  Monetary Channels 





Initial volatility  I            
Durable-goods share  C, N    C, N  C, N         
Nondurable-goods share  C, N    N, I           
Extractive  share    N,  N        
Energy consumption    C, I             
Firm size          C, C       
Deposit share of 5 largest banks            N, N     
Banking  deregulation  dummies          I,  I 
Increase in share w/HS diploma              I, N   
Decrease in share aged 15-29              N, I   
The first letter refers to the volatility ratio while the second letter (if there is one) refers to the break date.  The 
letter “C” indicates “consistent with the hypothesis” (statistically significant and with the right sign) an “I” 
indicates “inconsistent with the hypothesis” (statistically significant and with the wrong sign) and an “N” 
indicates that it is neither consistent nor inconsistent with the hypothesis (not statistically significant). 



















Break strongly pref'd; < 3 yrs from agg   (24)
Break strongly pref'd; > 3 yrs from agg   (14)
Break not strongly pref'd   (4)
Break not preferred   (7)
 
 
















Break after 87:09   (10)
Break between 84:09 and 87:09   (9)
Break between 81:09 and 84:09  (15)
Break before 81:09   (4)
Break model not preferred   (11)
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Figure 4:  Volatility Reductions and Banking Deregulation  Figure 4:  Volatility Reductions and Banking Deregulation 
The vertical axis is the volatility ratio while the horizontal axis is the difference between the date of the 
state’s earliest banking deregulation and the estimated date of its structural break. 
The vertical axis is the volatility ratio while the horizontal axis is the difference between the date of the 
state’s earliest banking deregulation and the estimated date of its structural break. 
0.572 = Aggregate volatility
 reduction
X < 0.52   (10)
0.52  < X < 0.572  (13)
0.572 < X < 0.69   (13)










-16 -14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
years
AL
AR
AZ
CA
DE
CO
DC
CT
FL
IL
GA
IN
ID
IA
MI
KS ME
KY
MD
LA
MA
MN
MT
MS
NE
MO
NV
NC
NH
ND
NJ
OH
NM
OK
NY
OR
SC
PA
SD
RI
TN
UT
WV
VT
WI
VA
WY
WA TX
  30